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As the title of my paper reveals, the question that I want to discuss is a simple one: 
How should we justify ethical criticism of literature? To try to answer this question 
may, however, seem like a strange task for two very different reasons. 
First of all, we must remember that ethical criticism presupposes some kind 
of objective morality.1 In other words, in order to justify ethical criticism, it would 
be necessary to begin by presenting an elaborate philosophical theory proving – 
once and for all – that certain actions and values are moral, while others are 
immoral. This would no doubt be an interesting way to begin, but it would also be 
rather ambitious, and I fear that we should never get back to the original question. 
I will therefore simply assume that a statement like “Hitler was evil” is both 
meaningful and true. 
Second of all, if the validity of our basic moral intuitions is taken for granted, 
it appears that the rest of the job has already been done. After all, ethical criticism 
has been defended with great vigour by distinguished scholars such as Wayne 
Booth and Martha Nussbaum. So, what could possibly be left to add twenty-five 
years after the publication of Booth’s seminal book The Company We Keep? 
In fact, I do not wish to add anything. On the contrary, there’s an argument 
I would like to remove. The argument goes as follows: Ethical criticism is relevant, 
since “stories,” as Booth put it “(…) are our major moral teachers.” (Booth 2001:20) 
Booth repeated this idea so many times that one cannot help but think that he 
regarded it as essential to the defence of ethical criticism. Thus, I could cite dozens 
                                                          
1 By “objective morality” I refer to all views which hold that an ethical judgement can be true or false 
and that actions can be morally right or wrong. This is not to deny the importance of specific 
circumstances to moral deliberation. It may generally be wrong to kill, but right under certain 
conditions. Consequently, we might say that Macduff was right in killing Macbeth. The statement is 
true relative to that situation – that is, it is objectively true once the circumstances have been specified.  
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of passages where he expresses this view, but I will restrain myself and only 
mention a few: 
 
(…) the ethics of criticism is more obviously of universal concern than most other 
”ethics”. The ethical effects of engaging with narratives are felt by everyone in all times 
and climes, not just some special group of victims or beneficiaries. (Booth 1988:38) 
 
(…) no one who has thought about it for long can deny that we are at least partially 
constructed in our most fundamental moral character by the stories we have heard, or 
read, or viewed, or acted out in amateur theatricals: the stories we have really listened to. 
(Booth 2001:18-19) 
 
(…) when we really engage with the characters we meet and the moral choices those 
characters face, ethical changes occur in us, for good or ill–especially when we are young. 
(ibid.) 
 
Nussbaum, too, endorses the argument, saying: “Booth and I are talking 
about the interaction between novel and mind (…) We do not claim that this part 
of one’s life inevitably dominates, although we do think that if the novels are 
ethically good it will have a good influence, other things being equal (…)” 
(Nussbaum 2001:68) or to take one final example, Marshall Gregory stated in an 
article from 2010: 
 
(…) with the emergence of fMRI scanners and the development of cognitive science and 
evolutionary psychology (…) deep arguments and empirical evidence about how literary 
art makes its impact are beginning to emerge. (…) [One] of the most exciting and 
significant terms in neural research and cognitive science is ‘brain plasticity,’ (…) Brain 
plasticity refers to the brain’s capacity to do two things, first, to continue developing until 
about age twenty-five, (…) and, second – and most significant for ethical criticism – the brain is 
now known to change physical structure and functioning on the basis not merely of 
physical input (…) but on the basis of imaginative and hypothetical input, such as that 
stimulated by poetry, narratives, and story telling. (My emphasis) (Gregory 2010) 
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It is quite easy to see the appeal of such an argument to anyone engaged in 
the humanities, since it lends importance to the work of the literary critic – whose 
work is nowadays often considered to be of little importance. The critic is 
immediately assigned the noble role of protecting readers – and perhaps even 
society at large – against the harmful effects of immoral books; his job becomes, 
at least in part, that of warning against the dangers involved in reading certain 
works. However, it is worth noticing that this air of importance comes at a price. 
It is only a small step from the idea that some books need to come with a 
warning to the idea that truly unethical books ought to be banned. I am, of course, 
well aware that the critics I have mentioned do not support censorship, but it 
seems to me important to emphasize two things here: Firstly, even though they do 
not condone censorship the argument with which they most commonly justify 
ethical criticism, will easily support those who do. And, secondly, when they have 
tried to explain why they oppose censorship, they have tended to undermine their 
own defence of this sort of criticism.  
Take, for instance, Marshall Gregory, who writes: “Censorship is a red-
herring and has no more to do with ethical criticism in any necessary way than the 
precious Unities had to do with good drama.” (Gregory 2005:59) He goes on to 
explain:  
 
No ethical critic supposes that censorship will even or ever work, much less that it will 
make people virtuous. (…) [And] no ethical critic who has really thought about the 
complexity of the relationship between ethics and literature has such faith in the infallibility 
of his or her judgment that he would even want, much less attempt to exercise, the power 
to coerce other people to do her literary bidding. (ibid.) 
 
If we focus on the beginning of the quotation, we might agree with Gregory: 
Censorship will probably not have the desired effect of making anyone anymore 
virtuous – but if actively removing those books that we judge to be morally 
corruptive, will not influence the moral character of readers, how serious can we 
honestly believe the consequences of reading to be? And if censoring immoral 
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literature will have no effect, what are the chances that ethical criticism will? Now 
if we turn our attention to the second part of the quotation, we may be surprised 
by how little confidence Gregory seems to have in the results attained by his 
favourite mode of criticism. It is, no doubt, true that there are morally ambiguous 
works, like Céline’s Journey to the End of the Night, where it is immensely difficult to 
pronounce a final verdict, but what about the writings of Marquis de Sade or 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra? Are we really not in a position to say that these 
texts are thoroughly immoral? It appears that Gregory, in order not to condone 
censorship, is claiming that ethical criticism will never produce any actual 
knowledge. But what, then, is the point of doing it? 
A similar argument is made by Booth, when he offers us his reason for 
opposing dogmatic moralizing. He writes: ”The fact is that (…) each of us can 
draw quite diverse values from what we call the same story, depending on our age 
and circumstance.” (Booth 1988:69) Once again this is not a very strong argument 
against censorship, for as Booth himself remarks “[Some works]–say the 
sadomasochistic novels of the Marquis de Sade and Georges Bataille–will for most 
people in most cultures provide a highly dubious diet.” (Booth 1988:59) But what 
is more, if we combine these two elements – the belief that ethical criticism is best 
defended by reference to how readers are influenced by literature, and the 
observation that the same book will affect different readers differently – we are, in 
effect, placing ethical criticism in a state of almost complete relativity, since the 
moral value of any book will be relative to its specific reader. Of course, there are 
what we might call “no brainers”; I am, for instance, fairly certain that no one will 
disagree, when I say that American Psycho is not an appropriate bed-time story for 
small children. But is Sartre’s Nausea or The Stranger by Albert Camus good for 
teenagers? The answer, I believe, depends entirely on the teenager in question: 
Such books could wake him up or break him down, but whether they will do one 
or the other, we do not know, because the answer is not to be found in the literary 
works. 
At the end of The Company We Keep Booth returns to the question of “(…) the 
obvious relativity of every ethical offering to the ethos of the person to whom it is 
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offered (…)” (Booth 1988:489). In this connection he writes: “The fact that no 
narrative will be good or bad for all readers in all circumstances need not hinder 
us in our effort to discover what is good or bad for us in our condition here and 
now.” (ibid.) I do not cite this passage in order to repeat the points, I have just made 
(although I must admit that I am at a loss to say who he is referring to, when he 
refers to “us” or how broadly or narrowly he defines “here and now”). Instead I 
would like to show that how we justify ethical criticism will have normative 
implications for our practice as critics.  
First of all, if we are primarily interested in the effects of reading – or to use 
Booth’s formulation, whether certain books will be good for us or bad – our 
criticism will focus, not on what any literary work means, but on what it does. And, 
second of all, the works that it will be relevant to deal with will be those that are 
most likely to influence a vast number of people: say, the novels of Stephen King 
or Danielle Steele, the Twilight books or Fifty Shades of Grey. It is quite a curious fact 
that while many critics have justified ethical criticism in this way, few have 
bothered to analyse such works. On the contrary they have focused almost 
exclusively on the so-called classics – even though the classics, to quote Caleb 
Thomas Winchester, are books that everybody wants to have read, but nobody 
wants to read. 
I would like to illustrate the absurdity of worrying too much about the effects 
of literature, by turning to a novel that has received general praise for its ability to 
help people; namely The Alchemist by Paolo Coelho. By now The Alchemist has sold 
more than 65.000.000 copies around the world, and according to The Times (I 
quote from the cover of my English copy), Coelho’s books: “(…) have had a life-
enhancing impact on millions of people.” At first glance this story is fairly 
innocent: The Andalusian shepherd Santiago sleeps in an abandoned church at 
night and has a recurring dream about a child, who tells him that he should travel 
to the pyramids in Egypt in order to find a hidden treasure. A short while hereafter, 
he meets an old man, who convinces him that he should, indeed, go on this 
journey, for it is his destiny. When Santiago asks, what it means to follow one’s 
destiny, the old man answers: 




Everyone, when they are young, knows what their destiny is. At that point in their lives, 
everything is clear and everything is possible.  
They are not afraid to dream, and to yearn for everything they would like to see 
happen to them in their lives. But as time passes, a mysterious force begins to convince 
them that it will be impossible for them to realize their destiny. (…) To realize one’s 
destiny is a person’s only real obligation. (…) And, when you want something, all the 
universe conspires in helping you to achieve it.” (Coelho 2012:20-21) 
 
Santiago commences his journey and when he arrives at Sahara, he joins a 
caravan going to Egypt. Here he befriends an Englishman, who studies alchemy. 
The Englishman is heading for the oasis Al-Fayoum, where he wants to meet a 
wise alchemist, and Santiago, too, stays in Al-Fayoum, where he meets the beautiful 
Arab woman Fatima, with whom he falls in love, and who falls in love with him. 
But the wise alchemist wants to take Santiago to the dessert and find the treasure. 
This is Santiago’s destiny, and if he does not follow his dream, he shall never be 
truly happy. As the alchemist says: “You must understand that love never keeps a 
man from pursuing his destiny. If he abandons that pursuit, it’s because it wasn’t 
true love … the love that speaks the Language of the World.” (ibid. 115) When 
Santiago finally reaches the pyramids he finds no treasure, but is instead ambushed 
by robbers. Fortunately, they quickly discover that he owns nothing, and they start 
a conversation. Santiago tells them why he has travelled to the pyramids, and one 
robber replies that dreaming is pointless: He himself has dreamt of a treasure, 
buried under an abandoned church in Spain. Immediately Santiago realizes that it 
is the very church in which he had his original dream. He therefore travels to Spain 
and, at his starting point, he finds the treasure. At last he can go back to Al-Fayoum 
and marry Fatima.2 
It is here that we, in following the traditional way of justifying ethical 
criticism, should ask: How does this story affect the reader? Of course, once again, 
the answer will depend on the individual in question, but it is not unthinkable that 
                                                          
2 As some might notice, Coelho has borrowed the plot from a story found in One Thousand and One 
Night. The “philosophy,” however, is entirely his own. 
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for the majority of readers it could be a source of hope. It might give them the 
push they need to pursue their dreams and make a better life for themselves; it may 
even inspire some to fight their way out of poverty, just like Santiago goes from 
being a poor shepherd to being a rich man. All of these consequences are possible, 
but are they in any way relevant to the moral value of the novel?  
The answer, I believe, is no. No external consequences will alter the fact that 
The Alchemist is morally reprehensible. To see this, we merely have to ask: What is 
it that Santiago learns – and that we, as readers, are asked to learn – in the course 
of this story? At the beginning of the novel the old man says so directly: To follow 
one’s destiny is one’s only duty. No other duties count. But what, then, is the 
mysterious force that tries to convince us that it will be impossible to realize our 
destiny? Whatever the precise answer may be, this mysterious force will often 
manifest itself in the ethical obligations that we, as human beings, feel towards one 
another. A young man might fall in love, get married and have children. One day, 
years later, he realizes that he never dreamt of being a husband or a father. In his 
early youth he really wanted to be a movie star in Hollywood, and now the desire 
to pursue his dream resurfaces. Yet he is torn. He knows that it would be selfish 
of him to ask his wife to uproot her entire life, only so that he can become famous. 
What should he do? If we ask the implied author of The Alchemist, the answer is 
simple: He only has one duty, and that is, you will remember, to follow his destiny. 
Thus, he is free from any obligations regarding his wife and children. Their well-
being is utterly irrelevant, and if the wife should not wish to move, he can leave all 
of them with a clear conscience. In that case, their love for him is not real – since 
real love, as the alchemist says, can never hinder a man from following his destiny. 
By now it should be clear that I do not tell this story because I fear that Paulo 
Coelho’s readers will turn into irresponsible spouses or parents. Judging by the 
number of positive reviews the book has received, few people notice how selfish 
and cynical its central message actually is. The reason for this is obvious: In general 
people read quite superficially. There is, in my opinion, nothing wrong with this, 
but if the main concern of ethical criticism is what the effects might be of reading 
certain books, this fact should be taken into account. Whatever the work, in the 
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final analysis, is revealed to mean, is of little importance. And so, we will probably 
have to praise The Alchemist, even though, morally speaking, it is abominable. 
No doubt, there are people who do not care very much about the meaning of 
literature, and yet they do care immensely about its effects. These are the sort of 
people who object to a literary work, not because they believe it to advocate 
immorality, but because they fear that specific passages could affect readers 
negatively – whether the passages be too violent or too pornographic or, perhaps, 
too occult. Such people might well concede that ethical criticism should not focus 
on the meaning of texts, and that ethical critics should not waste their time on 
high-brow literature that hardly anyone reads. Instead, they would argue, we should 
focus our attention on bestsellers and try to discern whether their influence will be 
good or bad. At this point we must ask: Do we have any evidence that literature 
changes the moral outlook or the moral conduct of people to any significant 
degree?  
Earlier I quoted Gregory for writing that empirical evidence was beginning 
to emerge, proving, finally, that literature does in fact influence our sense of right 
and wrong. I do not know what evidence he is referring to, but according to 
Suzanne Keen, author of Empathy and the novel, such evidence does not exist. This 
she concludes after having examined statistical research and experiments involving 
fMRI scanners that have been conducted so as to test the extent to which people’s 
moral outlook is affected by what they read. Keen, furthermore, points out that: 
“(…) the impact of novel reading, even were it to be positively established, might 
well be statistically insignificant. Many more people read fiction sixty years ago 
than today.” (Keen 2007:26) It is certainly true that we are influenced by narratives, 
but we should not forget that we are exposed to narratives from morning till night, 
whether we open our newspaper or turn on the radio or the television. In today’s 
society literature plays a modest role, so if the relevance of ethical criticism depends 
on literature’s ability to influence people, it is likely we would have to conclude 
that ethical criticism is not very relevant. In short, if we want to justify ethical 
criticism, we will have to do it in a different manner. 
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Now I have spent a good amount of time criticizing Booth, something I am 
never quite comfortable with, since my admiration for his work far exceeds my 
annoyance with his habit of worrying about the consequences of reading. I was 
therefore enormously pleased when, after a more careful reading of some of his 
articles, and especially after having finished his much-neglected book Criticial 
Understanding, I found that he does indeed provide us with a much more subtle 
defence of ethical criticism. Perhaps I should also mention the other reason why I 
was so pleased; namely that this other defence came very close to the one I myself 
gave when I wrote my thesis. There I argued that ethical criticism is relevant for 
the simple reason that almost all literature considers moral questions and adhere 
to values, portrays certain things as worthy of our attention and others as 
worthless, certain actions and convictions as morally right while others as wrong. 
I hope you will not frown upon my self-indulgence when, for a brief moment, I 
will quote from my thesis: 
 
Every text implies an appeal to be read. As soon as the text is written it implies an author, 
addressing a possible reader and asking for his attention. Furthermore, the author has a 
purpose, and the nature of the purpose will be expressed, more or less clearly, by the text. 
It may be as in Coelho’s The Alchemist, as in Kahlil Gibran’s The Prophet and as in Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra to preach some kind of “truth” – or, as in George 
Orwell’s 1984 and in Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, it may be polemical. In such cases 
the works do not just contain an appeal to be read; they also ask us to listen to the thoughts 
and views that are presented. Opponents of ethical criticism would now say that we should 
not criticize these views, but merely take note of them. But is this not, in fact, to disparage 
the appeal which the literary work itself implies? The premise that we can consider 
ourselves to be responsible readers – that is, readers who take the text seriously – seems 
to be that we accommodate this appeal, which means that we formulate our criticism as a 
response. This is precisely what ethical criticism does. To respect the author (the actual 
author as well as the one implied) involves considering the message of the work as 
deserving of an evaluation, even if the evaluation, in the final analysis, turns out not to be 
positive. (My translation) (Gøttcke 2014:51) 
 
You may imagine my delight when, at the end of Critical Understanding, I 
encountered similar passages, like Booth’s suggestion that we: “(…) view texts and 
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their interpretations as a kind of conversation or dialogue between a text and a 
reader (…)” (Booth 1979:237) and his point that: “We all share an inescapable 
sense that texts’ demands differ, that notions of what kind of questioning is 
essential or proper or appropriate will shift from text to text.” (Booth 1979:241) 
Or take his justification of ethical criticism:  
 
No reader of any experience and integrity will always stop at the text’s self-proclaimed 
boundaries. I will no more accede to all the demands of Mein Kampf or Justine than to the 
demands of the con man’s text when it insistently rules out the question “Are you lying?” 
(…) We are thus led to two marks of the good reader or critic: reconstruction of what the 
text demands and recognition of the point at which violation of its demands will prove 
necessary (…) (Booth 1979:242) 
 
It is remarkable how thoroughly this understanding of criticism, as a 
conversation between reader and text, is overshadowed in The Company We Keep by 
Booth’s focus on how we are influenced by stories. I am aware that this idea could 
be implied by the metaphor invoked by the title of his book; books are friends, 
and friends are, no doubt, people with whom we converse. However, time and 
time again Booth undermines this metaphor by use of another: You are what you 
eat, meaning of course, you are what you read. This metaphor of dietetics is 
apparent whenever Booth criticizes literary friends for being “unhealthy,” as when 
he calls the writings of Marquis de Sade and Georges Bataille a highly dubious 
diet.3 If we abandon this idea and stop thinking about the critic’s job as similar to 
that of the dietitian, we will have distanced ourselves completely from the censors 
of the world. 
As I said before: All texts imply an appeal to be read, but not all texts ask to 
be taken seriously. Some authors obviously pursue more modest goals like 
entertaining the reader by telling funny anecdotes, like the ones found in Giovanni 
                                                          
3 This way of thinking is common among ethical critics. As Marshall Gregory writes: “For 
nutritionists, “we are what we eat” is a thumbnail way of saying that our regular diet is an important 
factor in our overall health. For ethical critics, a similar assumption is that readers’ regular imaginative 
diet–the consistent consumption of fictional images–is an important constituent of moral and ethical 
health (or ill health).” (Gregory 2005:57)  
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Boccaccio’s The Decameron. For this reason, I believe that Booth is quite right in 
saying that text’s demands differ and that the notion of what kind of questioning 
will be essential will shift from text to text. In The Decameron, for example, we hear 
the story of a woman, who deceives her husband, literally behind his back, and the 
implied Boccaccio surely wants us to take delight in the wit of the woman and 
laugh at the naivety of the husband. I am fairly certain that most of us would find 
this hard to do, if Boccaccio actually insisted that the story be taken seriously – if, 
in other words, we were asked to believe that people ought to cheat each other for 
their own benefit whenever possible. But preaching is not Boccaccio’s business; 
his business is merely to entertain. As the narrative frame makes clear he knows 
that the world is full of sorrow and despair. He has written The Decameron as a 
refuge from the harsh realities of life, and we should enjoy it as such. Thus, only a 
stubborn puritan would be offended by these stories. 
This leads me to the principle with which I wish to conclude my paper: The 
more weight the implied author puts on the values expressed by his work, the more 
relevant ethical criticism will be. A book may be full of Holocaust jokes, without 
it being morally significant, as long as it is made clear that they are meant only as 
jokes. However, as soon as the author demands that we laugh on the premise that 
Holocaust itself was funny, ethical criticism becomes relevant. To decide when an 
author, as we say, crosses the line, will often be harder to do in practice than in 
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